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Abstract: The financing decisions of banks remain an enigma, increasingly attracting the attention of banking 
regulators and corporate finance scholars alike. The ‘buffer view’ of bank capital is premised on the notion 
that banks keep capital in excess of the regulatory requirements in line with bank specific factors. This study 
sought to test the ‘buffer view’ of bank capital. Utilising a sample of 16 South African banks for the period 
2006-2015, panel data techniques were employed to estimate a fixed effects model to test the relationship 
between buffer capital and the firm level determinants of capital structure. It was established that the risk 
and size variables were negatively related to the buffer capital variable, whilst the dividend variable was 
positively related. This was consistent with the predictions of the buffer view of capital. The findings lend 
credence to the ‘buffer view’ school of thought about bank capital. These findings are also inconsistent with 
bank capital regulations solely determining the capital structures of banks but epitomises some measure of 
voluntary capital structure decision making by banking firms.   
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1. Introduction 
 
Banks play a critical role in intermediation in any economy. It is for this reason that their financial well-being 
is a subject that attracts the attention of monetary authorities. The main thrust of the financial regulation of 
banks is to ensure the safety and financial soundness of the banking sector. At worst, the financial problems 
bedevilling a banking institution could precipitate a bank run. The failure of a large bank, then, can cause 
psychological contagion, leading depositors to start runs on other banks (Hart & Zingales, 2011: 3). This is a 
situation whereby the depositors will ‘panic’ and withdraw their funds in anticipation of the bankruptcy and 
demise of their banking institution. As the banking institutions are interconnected, the demise of one banking 
institution can result in a contagion effect, resulting in the distress of other banking institutions. Bank runs 
cause real economic problems because even ‘healthy’ banks can fail, causing the recall of loans and the 
termination of productive investment (Diamond & Dybvig, 1983: 402). Suffice to highlight that there is 
systemic risk posed by the failure of one banking institution. As such, monetary authorities have a vested 
interest in regulating the banking sector. Therefore, the attainment of a safe and financially sound banking 
sector is predicated on the establishment of an effective financial regulatory regime. The two approaches that 
are at the disposal of monetary authorities are the micro-prudential and the macro-prudential regulatory 
regimes. The former regime involves the bank regulator specifically tailoring an individualistic regulatory 
response for each banking firm, while the latter regime involves the bank regulator taking a holistic view of 
banking regulation and promulgating standardised regulations for the entire industry.  
 
To achieve the objective of fostering a financial sound banking sector, various capital regulations have been 
promulgated over the years, starting with Base I Accord in 1988 to the present day Basel III regulatory 
framework. These provisions amongst other laid the minimum capital requirements that should be observed 
by banks. Notwithstanding, a growing strand of empirical studies have demonstrated that banks keep capital 
in excess of the regulatory minimum (refer to, among other scholars, Berger, Herring and Szegö, 1995; 
Berger, DeYoung, Flannery, Lee & Öztekin, 2008; Besanko & Kanatas, 1996; Gropp & Heider, 2010; Muneer et 
al., 2011). The ‘buffer view’ of bank capital contends that banks seek to keep capital in excess of the 
prescribed regulatory minimum requirements. Several reasons have been advanced in support of the 
hypotheses that banks keep buffer levels of capital. Firstly, it has been argued that banks keep buffer capital 
for fear of regulation sanction should they deviate below the minimum threshold. Secondly, banks keep 
buffers to insulate themselves against the insolvency risk.  Thirdly, buffers act as a cushion for banks to 
mitigate adverse business and economic cycles. It is instructive to note that the importance of buffer capital 
has been acknowledged and enshrined in the Basel III Accord.It was enshrined in the accord that banks are 
required to reduce procyclicality and promote countercyclicality by introducing capital conservation and 
countercyclical buffers to curtail systemic risk. Fourthly, banks hold buffer capital as a risk absorption 
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mechanism. This ensures that bank can grow their loan books with the necessary capital to absorb the 
additional loan portfolio risk. Fifthly, banks may be motivated to keep excess levels of capital if the 
adjustment costs are prohibitive. Sixthly, the buffer view may also be explained by information asymmetry 
that might exist in bank financing. For instance, dividend-paying, high-growth, profitable and large banks are 
rated favourably by the equity market and hence can issue equity at short notice. As such, they can hold low 
levels of capital (Gropp & Heider, 2010: 595). The empirical studies have also demonstrated that the firm 
level determinants of capital structure also have a predictive power on bank buffer. As such, bank buffers are 
dependent on bank characteristics such as size, growth and profitability, among other factors.  
 
The principal motivation behind this study was to test the ‘buffer view’ of bank capital within the context of a 
developing country and also incorporating the 2007 to 2009 global financial crises. South Africa was 
employed as the test case, due to its developed financial system notwithstanding that it is a developing 
country. Unlike previous studies on bank buffers, this study took cognisance of the fact that banks rely on one 
another in their financing of operations through their interaction in the inter-bank market. As such this study 
tested and corrected for cross-sectional dependenceand utilised the Driscoll and Kray (1998) estimator 
which produces heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation- consistent standard errors that are robust to general 
forms of spatial and temporal dependence. This study extends the existing knowledge in that it was 
conducted within a developing country context, an area which has been under-researched. The study also 
offers insight as to the effect of the global financial crises on bank buffers. The rest of the article is organised 
as follows: the next section reviews the related literature. Section 3 discusses the research methodology 
employed. Section 4 presents and discusses the empirical findings and Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Literature Review 
 
Banking regulation and buffer capital: The regulation of banking firms may promote or curtail the banks 
from operating at their desired target capital structure. According to Ahmad and Abbas (2011: 201), 
following mandatory bank capital standard requirements, banks are involved in both voluntary and 
involuntary capital structure decisions. They go on further to observe that voluntary capital structure 
decisions of banks are considered the same as in non-financial settings; same theories and determinants of 
capital structure are applied to decisions relating capital structure. Involuntary capital structure decisions are 
enforced on the banks by regulatory authorities after deviating from the prescribed and adequacy capital 
requirements as directed by the regulators. The motivation behind the holding of buffer capital is one such 
voluntary capital structure decision by banks, which continues to baffle researchers and regulators alike. 
Several reasons have been advanced in attempting to address the rationale behind banks keeping buffer 
capital. Buffer capital may be defined as the amount of capital that banks hold in excess of the minimum 
regulatory capital requirement.  Berger et al. (1995:8) contend that banks may hold a substantial buffer of 
additional capital as financial slack so that they can borrow additional funds quickly and cheaply in the event 
of unexpected profitable investment opportunities.  Similarly, such a buffer of capital protects against costly 
unexpected shocks to capital if the financial distress costs from low capital are substantial and the 
transactions costs of raising new capital quickly are very high. Buffer capital can further act as a cushion, 
absorbing costly unexpected shocks, particularly if the financial distress costs from low capital, and the costs 
of accessing new capital quickly, are high (Jokipii and Milne, 2008:13). Proponents of the “buffer capital view” 
argue that banks hold capital as a buffer against insolvency. As such, banks have an incentive to avoid failure 
through a variety of means, including holding a capital buffer of sufficient size, holding enough liquid assets, 
and engaging in risk management (Cebenoyan and Strahan, 2004:2). The impact of regulation has banks 
holding capital buffers, or discretionary capital, above the regulatory minimum in order to avoid the costs 
associated with having to issue fresh equity at short notice (Gropp and Heider, 2010:595).  In essence by 
holding capital as a buffer, banks essentially insure themselves against costs related to market discipline or 
supervisory intervention in the event of a violation of the requirements. 
 
The empirical evidence in support of the buffer capital view has been mixed. In support, amongst others, 
Gambacorta and Mistrulli (2004:443) find evidence that for all kinds of banks the buffer capital has always 
been much greater than zero. They reason that this is consistent with the hypothesis that capital is difficult to 
adjust and banks create a cushion against contingencies. Koziol and Lawrenz (2009:871) also find evidence 
that banks do not hold the minimum capital but have voluntary capital buffers. Harding, Liang and Ross 
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(2013) find evidence that there exists an interior optimal capital ratio for banks with deposit insurance, a 
minimum capital ratio and bank franchise value. They reason that banks voluntarily choose to hold capital in 
excess of the required minimum. Allen, Carletti and Marquez (2011) and Jacques and Nigro (1997) also find 
evidence that banks will hold buffer capital in excess of regulatory requirements. There is another strand of 
literature that does not find support for the buffer view of capital. Gropp and Heider (2010:589) observe that 
high levels of banks’ discretionary capital do not appear to be explained by buffers that banks hold to insure 
against falling below the minimum capital requirement. Moreover, banks that would face a lower cost of 
raising equity at short notice (profitable, dividend paying banks with high market to book ratios) tended to 
hold significantly more capital. Teixeira, Silva, Fernandes and Alves (2014:56) also fail to find evidence in 
support of the buffer view. It is also instructive to note that the conservation of buffer capital has been 
instituted in the Basel III accord regardless of the unresolved debates. Suffice to conjecture that the 
advantages of banks keeping buffer capital outweigh the disadvantages. According to BIS (2010:9) the 
purpose of a buffer is to provide capital sufficient for a banking company to withstand downturn events and 
still remain above its regulatory minimum capital requirement.  
 
As has been demonstrated hitherto, capital requirements and deposit insurance are the two regulatory 
instruments that are in the armoury of the banking regulator which could have a bearing on capital structure 
choices of banking firms. Gropp and Heider (2010:589) set out to establish whether capital requirements are 
indeed a first-order determinant of banks’ capital structure. They employed cross-section and time-series 
variation in a sample of large, publicly traded banks spanning 16 countries, namely; the United States and 15 
countries of the European Union from 1991 until 2004. They also sought to establish whether deposit 
insurance determines the capital structure of banking firms. To the contrary they established that neither 
capital regulation nor deposit insurance is a first order determinant of capital structure of banks. They reason 
that the implication is that capital regulation is not binding. They also report similarities in the determinants 
of capital structures of banks and non-financial firms. Teixeira et al. (2014:34) also set out to establish 
whether regulation is a first order determinant of bank capital structure. They employed panel data of a 
sample of 560 banks, 379 from the U.S.A. and 181 from Europe, spanning 23 countries, for the period 2004–
2010. They found that the factors affecting the capital structure of non-financial firms play an important role 
in explaining banks’ capital structure. They reason that this suggested that regulation may not be a first order 
determinant of banks’ share of equity capital. They also document a strong similarity in the factors affecting 
the capital structure of banks and those of non-financial firms. 
 
The above foregoing suggests that banking regulation determines capital structure to a certain extent. 
Banking firms would stock up capital motivated by a variety of reasons, chief amongst them being fear of 
regulatory sanction, as well as the costs associated with raising capital at short notice should it fall below the 
required minimum. However, there are studies that have documented that the buffer capital stocked by 
banking firms is in excess and is inexplicable in-terms of providing cushion against the regulatory minimum.  
It has also been demonstrated that capital regulation might not necessarily be a first order determinant of 
bank capital structure but of secondary importance. This is a test for the efficacy of bank capital regulation. 
The implication is that the minimum capital requirements set for banks may not be binding in such a 
scenario. The majority of the studies also discount the moral hazard hypothesis of deposit insurance—that 
banks would seek to take advantage of mispriced deposit insurance. Also deposit insurance does not show up 
as a primary determinant of capital structure.  
 
Credit risk management: Banks manage credit risk in a variety of ways. The principal methods employed by 
banks to manage risks of their loan portfolio include the purchasing of credit derivatives as well as 
securitisation. One strand of literature has explored the relationship between risk management and capital 
structure of banking institutions. This has been premised on the notion that banks that actively manage their 
credit risk through, for instance the loan sales market (securitisation) are bound to keep lower levels of 
capital as compared to the banks that manage the credit risk passively. The second strand of literature 
advances the risk absorption hypothesis. Proponents of this view posit that bank capital absorbs risk and 
expands banks’ risk-bearing capacity. The first strand of literature focuses on the relationship between credit 
risk management and capital structure choices. Amongst these scholars, Cebenoyan and Strahan (2004:2) 
using a sample of all domestic commercial banks in the United States of America, test whether banks that are 
better able to trade credit risks in the loan sales market experience significant benefits. They find evidence 
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that banks that purchase and sell their loans (their proxy for banks that use the loan sales market to engage in 
credit-risk management) hold a lower level of capital per dollar of assets than banks not engaged in loan 
buying or selling.  They also document that banks that operate on both sides of the loan sales market also 
hold less capital than either banks that only sell loans but do not buy them, or banks that only buy loans but 
do not sell them. They reason that this difference is important because it suggests that the active rebalancing 
of credit risk – buying and selling rather than just selling (or buying) – allows banks to alter their capital 
structure. Further they posit that their results also suggest that banks use the risk-reducing benefits of risk 
management to take on more profitable but higher risk activities to operate with greater financial leverage. 
Froot and Stein (1998:1) demonstrate that at the same time that banks are investing in illiquid assets, most 
banks also appear to engage in active risk management programs.  They postulate that, holding fixed its 
capital structure, there are two broad ways in which a bank can control its exposure to risk. First, some risks 
can be offset simply via hedging transactions in the capital market. Second, for those risks where direct 
hedging transactions are not feasible, the other way for the bank to control its exposure is by altering its 
investment policies. Therefore, with illiquid risks, the bank’s capital budgeting and risk management 
functions become linked. 
 
The second strand of literature tests the risk absorption hypothesis. Amongst these scholars, Allen, Carletti 
and Marquez (2011:36) develop a model that demonstrates that when banks directly finance risky 
investments, they hold a positive amount of equity capital as a way to reduce bankruptcy costs and always 
prefer to diversify if possible. In contrast, when banks provide loans to non-financial firms that invest in risky 
assets, diversification is not always optimal. Berger et al. (2008:3784) examine bank liquidity creation by 
employing a sample including almost all commercial banks in the United States that are in business during 
the period 1993 to 2003. They find that for large banks, the relationship between capital and liquidity 
creation is positive, consistent with the expected empirical dominance of the “risk absorption” effect. In sharp 
contrast, for small banks, the relationship between capital and liquidity creation is negative, consistent with 
the expected dominance of the “financial fragility crowding out” effect for these institutions. The relationship 
is not significant for medium banks, suggesting that the two effects cancel each other out for this size class. 
Credit risk management attaches much importance in the formulation of capital structure policies of banking 
organisations. It has been demonstrated that those banking institutions that actively manage credit risk will 
be much inclined to keep lower levels of buffer capital in comparison to those who do not actively manage the 
risk. On the other hand, the risk absorption hypothesis predicts that large banks are most likely to keep 
higher levels of buffer capital in order to be best placed in absorbing more risks, as they grow their loan book. 
 
3. Data and Methodology 
 
Sample description and data Sources: The population for this study comprised of South African banking 
institutions both listed and not listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange. All the banks with complete data 
sets for the ten-year period running from 2006 to 2015 were considered for this study. There were 16 such 
banks. The Bureau van DijkBankscope database was used to source the audited financial statements of the 
banks.  
 
Variable definition 
 
Dependent variable: The dependent variable employed in this regard is the excess of Tier 1 regulatory capital 
ratio over the prescribed Tier 1 regulatory capital ratio (BUFFER). 
 
Independent variables: The independent variables consisted of the firm level determinants of capital 
structure as well as dummy variables. The firm level determinants of capital structure that are reliably 
important and were considered for this study are size, growth, profitability, asset tangibility and credit risk. 
Dummy variables were employed for this study are to capture the effects of the 2007-2009 financial crises as 
well as to capture one remaining firm level determinant of capital structure—dividends.  
 Size: To measure size the natural logarithm of total assets was employed. There is a direct 
relationship between size and the value of assets held. Larger companies are expected to have more 
assets. Most studies on the determinants of capital structure have employed this proxy to measure 
size. Such studies include, Al-Najjar and Hussainey (2011); Antoniou, Guneyand Paudyal (2008); 
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Booth, Aivazian, Demirguc‐Kuntand Maksimovic (2001); Frank and Goyal (2009); Mukherjee and 
Mahakud (2010) and Oztekin and Flannery (2012) amongst others.  
 Growth: The growth variable was defined as the annual growth rate of total assets. We took cue from 
Titman and Wessels (1998) and Anarfor (2015) amongst others, in defining growth as such. The 
reasoning is that the higher the growth rate, the higher the growth prospects of the company. The 
alternative definition which has also been used widely in empirical studies would have been to proxy 
growth prospects with the market-to-book value ratio (see amongst others, Booth et al., (2001; Frank 
and Goyal, 2009; and Teixeiraet al., 2014).  
 Asset tangibility: In this study asset tangibility was defined as the ratio of fixed assets to total assets. 
The ratio of fixed assets to total assets expresses the collateral value. Fixed assets offer collateral 
value. If collateral value is high, the firm would be viewed in good light in the debt market. As such it 
could access loans at concessionary rates. The fixed assets to total assets ratio was employed as a 
proxy for asset tangibility as extant studies have utilised this measure.  The empirical studies that 
have employed this measure include Rajan and Zingales (1995); Frank and Goyal (2009); Mukherjee 
and Mahakud (2010); Oztekin and Flannery (2012) and De Jonghe and Oztekin (2015) amongst 
others. 
 Profitability: Various measures have been employed in empirical studies to capture the effect of 
profitability. This is partly because profitability is defined in several ways. In this study we employ 
the return on assets (ROA) measure as the proxy for profitability. Boot et al. (2001) and Anarfor 
(2015) amongst others, employ ROA as an indicator of profitability in similar studies.  In the case of 
the banks this is defined as the return on average assets (ROAA). 
 Risk: The proxy that we employ for risk measures bank credit risk. It is defined as the ratio of 
impaired loans to gross loans.  
 Dummy variables: Two dummy variables were utilised in this study. The first one was the dummy 
variable (DIVIDEND) for dividend payers. It was defined as one, when a bank paid out a dividend and 
zero when the bank did not declare a dividend. The second dummy variable (GFC) was to capture the 
effects of the financial crises. It was defined as one for the years when the financial crisis occurred 
and zero otherwise. 
 
Empirical model specification and estimation techniques: To examine the relationship between buffer 
and the firm-level determinants of capital structure, a static panel data model was employed. Diagnostics 
tests were performed to ensure that the model was well specified and in order to select the most appropriate 
estimation technique to run the regression. The econometric analysis was conducted by employing Stata 
version 14 software. 
The static panel data model was specified as follows: 
 
𝑋𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡 = 𝒙𝑖,𝑡
′ 𝜷 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡  (1) 
 
Where: 
𝑋𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡 = buffer capital for banking firm i at time t. 
𝒙𝑖,𝑡
′ = a vector of explanatory variables (size, profit, growth, asset tangibility, dividend, risk and GFC) for 
banking firm iat time t. 
β = a vector of slope parameters 
𝛼𝑖= group-specific constant term which embodies all the observable effects. 
εi,t = composite error term which also takes care of other explanatory variables that equally determines 
leverage but are not included in the model. Equation (1) was estimated using the fixed effects with Driscoll 
and Kray (1998) standard errors estimator, which controls for cross-sectional dependence and 
heteroscedasticity which were the characteristics of this data set.  
 
4. Empirical Results 
 
Summary statistics: This section presents the summary statistics of all the variables that were used. The 
trends of the variables over time are also described. The descriptive statistics of the variables are presented 
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in Table 1: These are the central measures of tendency (mean and median), standard deviation, minimum 
and maximum values for the sample of banking firms under consideration.  
 
Table 1: Summary statistics of the variables 
Variable Mean Median Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Buffer Capital 0.0957 0.0688 0.1135 -0.2600 1.0561 
Growth 0.1592 0.1199 0.1962 -0.5775 1.1195 
Profit 0.0191 0.0134 0.0380 -0.1694 0.2036 
Asset 
Tangibility 
0.0102 0.0089 0.0083 0.0005 0.0400 
Risk 0.0528 0.0249 0.0870 -0.0528 0.6878 
Size 10.8500 8.7100 5.0200 6.1800 27.5700 
Dividend 0.6500 1 0.4785 0 1 
GFC 0.3000 0 0.4597 0 1 
Note: GFC is the dummy variable representing the 2007-2009 global financial crises. 
 
South African banks on average experienced a mean year-on-year growth of 15.9% of their total assets. They 
also realised profits with a mean return of assets (ROA) of 1.9%. This is modest in comparison to non-
financial firms. Ramjee and Gwatidzo (2012:59) in comparison report a mean ROA of 17% for their sample of 
non-financial firms. The mean asset tangibility level of banks was one percent of total assets. This implies that 
on average one percent of South African banks’ total assets consisted of fixed assets. The average size of the 
bank approximated by the natural logarithm of total assets is 10.85. On average on any given year, 65% of the 
banks paid dividends. South African banks store buffer levels of capital. Buffer capital is defined as the excess 
of the actual Tier 1 regulatory capital over the regulated minimum Tier 1 regulatory capital. The variation in 
this buffer is exhibited in Figure 1. On average, banks have maintained buffer capital levels ranging between 
7% and 11%. 
 
Figure 1: The variation of buffer capital 
 
Correlation analysis: The correlations of buffer capital and the firm level determinants of capital structure 
are documented in Table 2.  
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Table 2: Correlation matrix of buffer capital and the main variables used in this study  
 Buffer Capital Growth Profit Asset  Risk Size  Dividend 
Buffer Capital 
 
1.000  
 
     
Growth    
 
-0.068 1.000      
Profit 
 
 0.284*** 0.411*** 1.000     
Asset  
 
0.157** 0.131 0.261*** 1.000    
Risk  
 
-0.001 0.047 -0.178** 0.123 1.000   
Size     
 
-0.284*** -0.127 -0.209*** -0.027 -0.004 1.000  
Dividend     
 
0.052 -0.069 0.002 -0.143* -0.196** 0.188** 1.000 
(*) / (**) and (***) indicates the (10%), (5%) and (1%) level of significance respectively.  The variables are 
defined as follows:  Buffer Capital= Tier1 Regulatory Capital ratio – Prescribed Tier 1 Regulatory Capital ratio;  
Growth=growth rate of Total Assets; Profit= Return on Average Assets (ROAA); Size= natural logarithm of 
Total Assets; 
Asset (Asset tangibility) =Fixed Assets/Total Assets; Credit risk= Impaired Loans/Gross Loans; Dividend = 
dummy variable = (1 when dividend is paid and, 0 when dividend is not paid). 
 
Profit is positively correlated with buffer capital. Highly profitable banks keep more levels of capital in excess 
of the regulatory requirement. This is consistent with the predictions of the buffer view of capital. Asset 
tangibility is positively correlated to buffer capital. This implies that banks that have more tangible assets 
stock more capital. This is consistent with the buffer view of capital. Lastly, size is negatively correlated to 
buffer capital. Small banks are inclined to keep more levels of capital in comparison to large banks. This is 
because they have not generated goodwill to readily shore up capital in the equity or debt markets at short 
notice, should the need arise, as compared to the large banks.  
 
Panel regression diagnostics: Initial diagnostics tests were conducted in order to estimate a robust model 
to test the relationship between buffer capital and the firm level determinants of capital structure. The results 
are reported in Table 3.  
 
Table 3:  Initial diagnostic tests  
Test Test 
Statistic 
Critical Value Inference 
Joint validity of cross-sectional 
individual effects 
H0: 𝜶𝟏 =  𝜶𝟐 = ⋯ 𝜶𝑵−𝟏  =  𝟎 
HA: : 𝜶𝟏 ≠ 𝜶𝟐 ≠ ⋯ 𝜶𝑵−𝟏 ≠ 𝟎 
 
F= 9.55 F(0.01,15,137)=4.142 Cross-sectional specific effects are valid. 
Joint validity of time effects 
H0: 𝝀𝟏 = 𝝀𝟐 = 𝝀𝒏−𝟏 = 𝟎 
HA:𝝀𝟏 ≠ 𝝀𝟐 ≠ ⋯ 𝝀𝒏−𝟏 ≠ 𝟎 
 
F=0.62 F(0.01,9,129)= 2.548 Time effects are invalid. The error term 
takes a one-way error component form. 
Breusch Pagan (1980) LM test 
for random effects  
H0:𝜹𝛍
𝟐 = 𝟎 
HA:𝜹𝛍
𝟐 ≠ 𝟎 
 
LM= 12.23 χ2(15) = 5.23 There is significant difference in 
variance across the entities. Random 
effects are present. 
Hausman (1978) specification 
test 
m3= 70.17 
 
χ2(6)=0.873 
 
Regressors not exogenous. Hence the 
Fixed effects specification is valid. 
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H0: 𝐄(𝛍𝐢𝐭|𝐗𝐢𝐭) = 𝟎 
HA: 𝐄(𝛍𝐢𝐭|𝐗𝐢𝐭) ≠ 𝟎 
 
Heteroscedasticity 
H0: 𝜹𝐢
𝟐 = 𝜹for all i 
H0: 𝜹𝐢
𝟐 ≠ 𝜹for all i 
 
Cross-sectional dependence 
tests 
H0:𝝆𝒊𝒋 = 𝝆𝒋𝒊 = 𝒄𝒐𝒓(𝝁𝒊𝒕, 𝝁𝒋𝒕) =
𝟎 
HA:𝝆𝒊𝒋 ≠ 𝝆𝒋𝒊 = 𝟎 
 
 
LM = 
2768.28  
 
 
χ2(16)=31.99 
 
 
The variance of the error term is not 
constant. Heteroscedasticity is present. 
(i)  
(ii) Pesaran (2004) CD test: 
 
(iii)  
 
(iv) Frees (2004) test:  
 
CD = 2.847 
(0.430) 
 
 
FRE= 1.620 
 
p = 0.0044 
 
 
 
Q(0.01)=0.5198 
 
Cross sections are interdependent. 
 
 
 
Cross sections are interdependent. 
 
The diagnostics confirmed the validity of fixed effects, absence of time effects, interdependence of cross-
sections, presence of random effects and heteroscedasticity. In the absence of time effects, a one-way model is 
specified. Subsequently, the FE estimator is applied. However, in order to avert estimation inefficiency 
rendered by the detected cross-sectional dependence and heteroskedasticity, estimation was done within the 
framework of Driscoll and Kray (1998). According to Hoechle (2007:282), the Driscoll and Kray (1998) 
estimator produces heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation- consistent standard   errors that are robust to 
general forms of spatial and temporal dependence.  
 
Panel regression results: Having run the initial diagnostics, the model was estimated. The results of the 
regression of the firm level determinants of capital structure on buffer capital are reported in Table 4. These 
results are premised on testing the hypothesis stated as follows: Bank leveraging is consistent with the buffer 
view of capital.  
 
Table 4: Panel regression results with buffer capital and Tier 1 capital as the dependent variables 
Explanatory Variable Fixed Effects with Driscoll and Kray (1998) standard errors 
Growth -0.147 
(-1.70) 
Profit -0.585 
(-1.12) 
Asset Tangibility 1.731 
(0.68) 
Risk -0.997*** 
(-4.21) 
Size -0.042** 
(-2.97) 
Dividend 0.076* 
(2.10) 
GFC -0.025** 
(-3.09) 
constant 0.584*** 
(3.93) 
Adjusted R2 0.4182 
(*) / (**) and (***) indicates the (10%), (5%) and (1%) level of significance respectively. The t-statistics for 
the fixed effects model are reported in parentheses.  
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The table above shows the results of estimating the following regression for the sample of 16 South African 
banks for the period 2006-2015. 
𝑋𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡 = 𝒙𝑖,𝑡
′ 𝜷 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡  
Where: the dependent variable = BUFFER=𝑋𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡;  𝒙𝑖,𝑡
′ = a vector of explanatory variables (size, profitability, 
growth, asset tangibility, dividend, credit risk and GFC) for bank i at time t; β = a vector of slope parameters; 
𝛼𝑖= group-specific constant term which embodies all the observable effects. 
εi,t = composite error term which also takes care of other explanatory variables that equally determines buffer 
capital but are not included in the model. 
 
The estimated results document four statistically significant results. Firstly, bank credit risk was negatively 
related to buffer capital and the result is statistically significant at the 1% level of significance. Banks with 
high credit risk keep low buffer capital in comparison to banks with less credit risk. Secondly, size is 
negatively related to buffer capital and the result is statistically significant at the 5% level of significance. 
Arguably, large banks are keeping low levels of capital because of the ease with which they can raise capital in 
the event that they deviate from the prescribed levels. Thirdly, the dividends variable is positively related to 
buffer capital. The relationship is statistically significant at the 10% level of significance. Dividend paying 
banks are keeping high buffer capital levels as compared to non-dividend paying banks. We reason that this 
phenomenon could perhaps be best explained by the signalling theory. Dividend paying banks send out the 
signal that their prospects are good and hence are viewed favourably by the debt and equity markets. Thus 
they are able to shore up their capital levels with much ease. Lastly, buffer capital is negatively associated 
with the global financial crises dummy variable. This corroborates the findings of Jokipii and Milne 
(2008:1450) who find a negative relationship between buffer capital and cycle.  
 
Table 5 draws comparisons between the predicted and estimated effects of the regression of the buffer 
capital variable on the firm level determinants of capital structure. Suffice to highlight that by and large, the 
financing of South African banks conforms to the buffer view of capital as the predicted results are in line 
with the estimated results for dividends, size and risk. This diminishes the role of regulation as being the 
first-order determinant of capital structure. The findings lend credence to the ‘buffer view’ school of thought 
about bank capital. These findings are also inconsistent with bank capital regulations solely determining the 
capital structures of banks but demonstrate that banks also voluntarily determine their capital structures 
subject to their bank specific attributes.  
 
Table 5: Predicted effect versus estimated effect of firm level factor on buffer capital 
Firm Level Determinant Predicted Effect Results of this Study 
Profitability Positive Insignificant 
Asset tangibility  No prediction N/A 
Growth Positive Insignificant 
Dividends Positive Positive 
Size Positive/Negative Negative 
Risk  Negative Negative 
 
5. Conclusion and Recommendations 
 
This study examined the “buffer view” of bank capital. The main view being tested was whether firm level 
determinants of capital structure have a predictive power on the banks stocking capital in excess of the 
regulatory minimum. The study controlled for cross-sectional dependence emanating from the dependence of 
banks on one another for financing. The fixed effects with Driscoll and Kray (1998) standard errors estimator 
was utilised to estimate a fixed effects model to test the relationship between buffer capital and the firm-level 
determinants of capital structure. Moderate support was found in favour of the buffer view school of thought. 
When the buffer capital variable was regressed on the firm level determinants of capital structure, it was 
found that the estimated results were consistent with the predictions of the buffer view. Specifically, the 
dividends variable was positively related to buffer capital, whilst size and risk were negatively related to 
buffer capital. This further diminishes the regulatory view of bank capital. The results also confirmed that the 
GFC was negatively related to buffer capital. In essence the South African bank capital buffers were eroded to 
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mitigate the effects of the GFC.The implication of these finding is that South African banks are financial sound. 
Notwithstanding as the monetary authorities grapple with the implementation of Basel III framework, we 
would like to offer some policy advise. Firstly, it would be prudent for regulatory authorities to expedite the 
institution of deposit-protection insurance to increase the safety nets available for depositors. Secondly it is 
advisable that the Basel III requirements be adapted to be in synch with the requirements of the South 
African banking sector as opposed to the current scenario of one-size-fits-all. 
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